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of the eighteenth century constitute an important chapter in the history of freedom of the press
and the growth of democratic government. While much has
been written about the trials and about the administration of
the criminal law in eighteenth-century England, little has been
said about the relationship between the libel prosecutions and
the more pervasive and long-standing problems of the
criminal law. 1 We have perhaps gone too far in positing-or
simply assuming-a separation between political high misdemeanors and common-run felony cases such as homicide and
theft. For there were points of contact between the two: most
notably, the trial jury was employed in both. It may be that theuse of the jury in the one kind of case influenced thinking
about how it ought to be used in the other. I shall explore this
subject in the light of the tract literature of the seditious libel
crisis. I hope to elucidate the oft-repeated arguments concerning the jury's right to decide law as well as fact, an alleged
"right" that meant different things to different writers, and to
say something about the kinds of knowledge that these projury writers thought jurors were to bring to their task. Finally,
I shall set forth some tentative conclusions concerning the
place that the seditious libel episode and its resolution had in
the history of the jury and the administration of criminal law. 2
By the time of the seditious libel crisis two strands of jury
law-finding theory remained intact, one active, the other
largely historical. A long-standing tradition in common-run
cases of merciful acquittals and "partial" verdicts against the
facts actually proved (for example, petty larceny instead of
grand larceny, manslaughter instead of murder) continued
apace with something close to official acquiescence. Although
true nullification of judicial instructions (as opposed to ad hoc
merciful verdicts that did not reflect repudiation of the law)
was not officially approved, some very respectable jurists not
only lauded the nullifying behavior of juries in some pre-168g
political cases but, more significantly, could be read as suggestTHE SEDITIOUS LIBEL TRIALS
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ing that there might be occasions on which juries would once
again be duty bound to play that role.
The seditious libel tracts reflect the influence of these
strands ofthought in a variety of ways. Especially, they reveal
both the extent to which the radical jury proponents were able
to build upon the views of the more conventional, establishment, writers and the importance of the interplay between notions of true nullification in political prosecutions and the tradition of merciful verdicts in common-run cases. After briefly
describing the seditious libel controversy (section 1) and the
historical development of jury trial (section 2), I shall examine
these themes, among others, in the course of considering, first,
varying views of the constitutional role of the criminal trial
jury (section 3) and, second, the tract writers' approach to
finding law (section 4), finding fact (sections), and applying
law to fact (section 6). My conclusion (section 7) puts the seditious libel controversy into historical perspective regarding the
social, political, and legal aspects of the institution of trial by
JUry.

The common-law crime of seditious libel consisted-broadly
speaking-of the intentional publication of a writing that
"scandalized" the government, that is, tended to bring it into
disesteem. Although indictments for seditious libel generally
alleged that the accused had acted "falsely, seditiously, maliciously, and factiously," the courts, as Holdsworth states,
laid it down that . . . the offence consisted of the intentional
publication of a document with the seditious or defamatory
meaning alleged by the prosecution . . . . [T]he function of the
jury was limited to finding these two sets of facts; ... it was for
the court to say as a matter of law whether a writing published
with this seditious or defamatory meaning was a libel. 3

Thus, the jury was to render what amounted to a special verdict (that is, a verdict stipulating the specific facts the jury had
found) in the form of a general verdict of "guilty" if it found
that the accused intentionally published the writing and if it
found that the writing bore the meaning alleged by the prosecution.
The official doctrine, which Star Chamber had originated
and transmitted to the common law, did not recognize truth as
a defense. 4 Moreover, it assigned to the court as a matter of
law two questions that had the appearance of questions of fact:
whether the act was done with criminal intent, and whether
the writing was seditious or defamatory. It was perhaps plausible to consider the latter question one of law because the nature of the crime typically meant that the entire record of the
allegedly criminal act was embodied in a physical specimen
that survived for judicial inspection. It was less plausible to
cast the question of criminal intent-or maliciousness-as one
oflaw, to be inferred by the court. On both counts, the official
doctrine was strongly resisted, from the Restoration trials of
Carr5 and Harris6 in 168o and the great case of the Seven Bishops
on the eve of the Glorious Revolution 7 down to the reform of
the doctrine by means of Fox's Libel Act in 1792. 8
We may note briefly the major phases of the seditious libel
debate in the eighteenth century. From the perspective of
nearly all participants in that debate, the Seven Bishops' Case
had taken on the garb of hallowed precedent. For nearly all
writers that great courtroom drama represented an act by the
people which paved the way for the constitutional settlement
that followed the Glorious Revolution ofx688-8g, wherein Englishmen consigned the law to its rightful place-the protective arms of an independent judiciary. 9 The case, which was
tried in a highly charged political atmosphere, involved the
prosecution of seven bishops who refused to read james II's
Declaration of Indulgence in their churches. Because the
bench divided on the question of whether the petition consti-

tuted a libel, that question was left, de facto, to the jury. 10 The
acquittal of the bishops was taken to be both a rejection of
James's pro-Catholic policies and a vindication, against the
views of the bench, of the jury's right to determine the questions of intent and libelousness. The Seven Bishops' Case became
a precedent for opposition to tyranny, an act oflast resort: jury
nullification of the law (that is, the official doctrine of seditious
libel, on which the bench had not una voce insisted) to save the
constitution. Yet for some, this did not require rejection of the
Stuart doctrine of seditious libel. An independent and impartial bench could be trusted (or so the theory ran) to assign and
determine all questions of law. Thus, in the century after the
Glorious Revolution, much of the legal establishment both accepted the constitutional settlement and adhered to the essential elements of the Stuart law of libel. 11
For many others, however, the Seven Bishops' Case stood for
more. It was a vindication of the integrity of the general verdict. For some this meant only that the traditional role of the
trial jury, the finding of fact and the application to fact of the
law as given by the bench, was preserved. Others, as we shall
see, envisioned the general verdict as including not merely application of the law but also true law finding.
From the outset the eighteenth-century debate concerning
the seditious libel doctrine was couched largely in Restoration
terms. Chief Justice Raymond, relying heavily on the formulation of his predecessor, Chief Justice Holt, restated the official doctrine (outlined above) succinctly in Rex v. Franklin in
1731, setting forth a division of judge-jury responsibilities that
the courts would attempt to effectuate until the passage of
Fox's Libel Act. 12 His opinion, in turn, revived the Restoration defense of the criminal trial jury. In 1732, John Rawles's
168o tract The Englishman's Right was reprinted for the first
time. The new preface, signed by one J. K., warned of developments that threatened to destroy all that had been won in
the Glorious Revolution and commended the tract "in which

the original design, duty and power of jurors are so clearly explained, that it will be sufficient to instruct all those, who shall,
on these occasions, have the lives and properties of their fellow-subjects in their hands." 13 In the tract itself, Hawles argued that in all cases, including libel, juries were the true
judges of law as well as of fact, not simply that, in libel, seditiousness and intent were matters of fact for the jury. 14
After Franklin's trial the contest over the doctrine of seditious libel falls into three principal stages. In 1752, the Crown
tried by special jury (frequently the practice in seditious libel
cases) a bookseller named William Owen for the sale of a tract
critical of the House ofCommons. 15 ChiefJustice Lee, on the
urging of the solicitor general, William Murray (the future
Lord Mansfield), charged the jury in accordance with Raymond's statement of the law. The jury, after hearing testimony
regarding Owen's character and loyalty to the Crown and
Camden's argument that the right to criticize Parliament was
fundamental, acquitted the defendant. Underlying Camden's
argument for the defense was the principle that, notwithstanding the bench's view of the law of seditious libel, unless the
jury was convinced that the allegations of falsity and scandalous intent in the indictment had been proved, it must acquit.16
The second stage in the English government's use of seditious libel laws to silence criticism of its policies began in 1763
with the prosecution ofJohn Wilkes for his famous number 45
of The North Briton 17 and ended in 1770 with the prosecution, on
informations ex officio, of those who published and sold the
"Junius" letter protesting the official policy toward the
American colonies. Mansfield, as chief justice of King's
Bench, enunciated the established law of seditious libel in the
trials of the bookseller John Almon 18 and the publishers Henry
Woodfall 19 and John Miller. 20 Glynn, who defended all three,
followed Camden's arguments in Owen almost verbatim. The
Crown obtained a conviction in the case of Almon. The Wood-
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fall jury returned a verdict of" guilty of printing and publishing only," which forced a judicial order for a new trial that was
never held. At the close of Miller's trial, the jury returned a
verdict of "not guilty" despite clear evidence of publication.
These widely publicized "Junius" trials and Mansfield's
consistent refusal to charge the jury that it should consider the
question of criminal intent provoked debate in Parliament
over the seditious libel law. Glynn introduced the question of
reform in the Commons; 21 Camden and Chatham supported
him in the Lords. 22 They could not, however, agree on a new
formulation. On the other side, opponents of reform raised the
specter ofjury control over the law and of the dissolution ofjudicial authority. 23 Some twenty years would elapse before sufficient support could be mustered to pass a bill giving the jury
the right to return a general verdict.
The third stage of the seditious libel crisis commenced
with the trial in 1783 of William Shipley, Dean of St. Asaph. 24
Unquestionably, Shipley's case was the most important seditious libel prosecution since the Seven Bishops' Case. Shipley
published a tract by his brother-in-law, Sir William] ones, that
allegedly incited to rebellion; 25 after he was convicted with a
verdict of "guilty of publishing only," a new trial was refused
despite Thomas Erskine's ringing defense on Shipley's behalf.
Yet after carrying the day on the law of libel, the bench set the
conviction aside for a defect in the indictment. 26
Mansfield won the battle, but he soon lost the war. The
campaign against the seditious libel law greatly intensified.
Erskine was lionized, and his cause was espoused in tracts, in
the press, and, fmally, in Parliament.27 Fox's Libel Act, passed
in 1792, did not convert the questions of intent and seditiousness into questions of fact but did state that in trials for seditious libel,
the jury sworn to try the issue may give a general verdict of
guilty or not guilty upon the whole matter put in issue . . . and
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shall not be required or directed . . . to fmd the defendant or defendants guilty, merely on the proof of the publication . . . and
of the sense ascribed to the same .... 28
The "whole matter" included the question of the existence of
criminal intent, which almost always had to be inferred from
the nature of the publication itself, and the question of whether
the writing was seditious. The statute affirmed the jury's right
to return a general verdict. It was clear that in doing so the
jury would necessarily have the right to apply the law (regarding criminal intent and seditiousness) as stated by the bench;
that the jury possessed the right to reject the law as stated by
the bench was neither stated nor implied. That it might do so,
in a concealed fashion, was undoubtedly understood-and (by
many) feared.2 9

2

Arguments over the jury's role in the more spectacular political cases had always been colored by perceptions of its role in
the daily administration of the criminal law. Thus, to understand the place of the seditious libel debate in eighteenthcentury law and politics, we must consider some aspects of the
history of the criminal trial jury. Specifically, we must consider
how two main eighteenth-century concepts of jury law finding
emerged out of age-old jury practices.
The English criminal trial jury emerged during the final
stage of the first great revolution in English criminal law, the
series of changes traditionally associated with Henry II and his
immediate successors. Over the course of the twelfth century,
and most dramatically during the last quarter of that century,
the criminal law was transformed from a private, compensation-based system of law into a public and-at least at the felony level-capital system of law. 30 The Crown had from the
outset sought lay cooperation in effectuating its policy. Trial on
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the king's suit, leading to execution at the hands of the Crown,
was set in motion by the procedure of presentment. It may be,
though we cannot be certain, that the lay presenters resisted
strict application of the new system of criminal law. 31 After the
abolition of the ordeal in 1215, the English adopted a system of
community-based fact fmding to act as a method of proof. Almost immediately community resistance to the strict application of the formal legal rules became visible. For several centuries there was little to impede this. The trial jury, self-informing and thus free to decide what constituted evidence, was able
to impose its concepts of liability upon the administration of
the criminal law. Many who slew out of sudden anger were acquitted or said to have acted in self-defense; many simple
thieves were saved from the gallows by acquittal. 32 We cannot
determine the extent of official acquiescence in this de facto jury
law-finding process. We may only suppose that authorities
devoted more of their limited resources to combating truly corrupt jury practices in cases involving professional criminals
than to contesting merciful jury verdicts in cases involving relatively marginal offenders.
The first important transformation in the history of the
criminal trial jury dates from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. It was associated with the rise of official prosecution practices. Justices of the peace began to play an active role in
gathering evidence that might be used in court to substantiate
indictments that they had taken and that assize clerks had
carefully reframed. 33 As this happened, the trial jury gradually
lost its self-informing role although it retained its role of assessing evidence and of rendering a verdict. While the jury had
not lost its power to nullify rules of law, the increasingly public
nature of the flow of evidence cost the jury some of its power to
conceal from the bench the degree to which an acquittal-or
for that matter a conviction-was based, not on strict application of law to fact, but on a sense of justice or some form of favoritism.34 Although the rise of the prosecution made it possi-

ble for officials to monitor jury behavior-and, if they so
chose, to bind over to Star Chamber even the merciful
jury35 -constraints of time, administrative capacity, and interest put the jury at greatest risk in those cases the Crown considered most serious. Thus, in the "middle period," the bench
used the available official machinery of jury discipline to the
fullest in some instances and allowed-even encouragedage-old community-based practices to continue in others. 36
Perhaps inevitably, the political opposition in the former instances came to articulate a theory ofjury law finding, to argue
not only that it was legitimate but also that it was integral to
the right to trial by jury. The Interregnum and Restoration
saw the writing of a good deal of bad history: de facto law-fmding practices in common-run felonies were construed as de jure
and generalized to all criminal cases. The basis for the jury's de
jure right to find the law was discovered in Anglo-Saxon liberties and in post-Conquest resistance to the Norman judiciary's
attempts to undermine true English justice. From Lilburne's
1649 trial to Penn's Case in 1670, and beyond, arguments concerning the original rights of English juries occupied an important place in English democratic writings. 37
The Leveller and Quaker law-finding theories never really
took hold, but they remained embedded in English resistance
theory and were, during the later years of the Restoration, appealed to by some of those who opposed the official doctrine of
seditious libel. They helped to form the ideological support for
what we may call the true law-finding, or nullifying, role of the
jury-its asserted duty to nullify the law in cases involving executive or judicial tyranny. 38
Because these theories presumed the possibility of conflict
between the jury and the bench, they must be distinguished
from the older and dominant, but much more modest, lawfinding theory of the criminal trial jury. According to that
theory, the jury as the fmal determiner of fact applied the law
more or less as stated by the bench but might, through its abil-
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ity to fmd facts or even at the behest of judges, mitigate the rigors of the law in appropriate cases. But this theory, which captures the nature of the period's modest de facto practices, was
never official doctrine, and the practices it approves of were
never unreservedly acquiesced in by the bench. The courts,
we have seen, episodically (though only rarely) punished juries
for modest leniency by binding them over to the Court of Star
Chamber; after the abolition of Star Chamber in 1641 they imposed fmes upon juries that rendered what the bench thought
of as unjustified acquittals. 39 Bushell's Case in 1670 marked the
end of such coercion. 40 In his famous opinion, Chief Justice
Vaughan held that jurors could not be fined for acquitting
against the weight of evidence because they alone had the responsibility to find the facts and the court could never know
completely how they saw them. 41 Vaughan's opinion, though
it grew out of a political case wherein the defendants had invoked the jury's right to find law, 42 did not sanction nullification-not even the modest, merciful practices that the noncoercible jury might (thanks to his opinion) have felt free to
implement. Within a decade, however, in response to the
Harris and Carr seditious libel prosecutions, anti-Stuart
writers (including john Rawles) had glossed Vaughan's opinion and it had entered the jury literature, much revised, as a
powerful argument for the jury's right to nullify the law-not
only to be merciful in common-run cases but also to overturn
what it regarded as unlawful judicial instructions in prosecutions for treason, seditious libel, or other essentially political
offenses. 43 These ideas appear to have gained some ground
even among the establishment opposition to James II.
However the anti-Stuart Whig leadership may have felt
about the more far-reaching jury law-fmding rhetoric, once it
had come to power in 168g it argued that the constitutional setdement, and especially the establishment of judicial independence, had rendered true jury nullification-nullification of
judicial instructions-unnecessary. Yet that same Whig re-

gime acquiesced in a great deal of jury mitigation of capital
sanctions-merciful application of the law-in common-run
cases. 44 Substantial penalties, such as the quasi exile of transportation, now existed for lesser offenses so that partial mitigation did not seriously flout the king' s justice or threaten popular security. 45
Although authorities acquiesced in such practices and even,
as some historians have argued, turned them to their own advantage-that is, by being seen to act mercifully, they engendered the deference of those they ruled46 -many jurists and lay
observers (including some political radicals)47 came to doubt
the deterrent effect-and hence the wisdom-of a system of
criminal law that corrected for the inhumanity of its prescribed
sanctions through ad hoc recourse to dispersed powers of mitigation. Henry Fielding, at mid-century, and then Blackstone,
Eden, Romilly, and others in later decades, condemned the
prevailing system. 48 They argued for a reformed, humane,
and effective law of sanctions, one that was moderate and proportional and that could be applied with certainty. Mitigation,
they conceded, could never be entirely dispensed with, but
what little would be required should be centered in the
Crown's pardoning power. The role of the jury would be to
find the facts. If it did so mercifully, it would be merciful in the
sense of extending the benefit of the doubt in close cases, not in
the sense of mercifully acquitting a defendant who on the evidence was clearly guilty. 49
Not surprisingly, however, these critics distinguished between the reformed future and the unreformed present: so
long as the law of sanctions remained overly severe, widespread mitigation, they recognized, was both inevitable and
just, a lesser evil, a form of "pious perjury. " 50 Beginning with
a critique of jury mitigation, the penal reformers ended by
providing its existence pro tern with an important element of
justification. And in yet another way the penal reform
writers-and indeed many others-lent support to the propo-
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nents of jury discretion, by recognizing the historic role of the
jury as a bulwark against tyranny, especially in political cases.
Though virtually all of them believed that this far-reaching
form of nullification was no longer likely to be necessary, they
were willing to pay lip service to this ultimate constitutional
role of the criminal trial jury, 51 as were, indeed, some members
of the bench. 52
3

The post-1750 discussion of the constitutional role of the
criminal trial jury was pervaded by arguments that drew upon
history. Virtually all commentators on the jury were convinced of the pre-Conquest origins of the jury. A few writers
searched for its prototype in the classical world; 53 some traced
the jury to the Goths; 54 most posited a Saxon origin, identifying the early laggamanni as combining the roles of judge and
jury. 55 For the most part, however, this fascination with the
earliest period of the jury remained an antiquarian exercise. It
is true that eighteenth-century jury proponents thought that
the jury's antiquity bolstered its place in the constitution, but
no one disputed that the jury deserved some place. Exactly
what place the jury ought to have was the question on which
contemporaries disagreed. Here the eighteenth-century theorists had little in common with their mid-seventeenth-century
forerunners. Few of the later writers contended, as had some
Levellers, that historically the jury had preceded the judiciary
or that the law flowed forth from the community through the
jury. Whatever their perspective on the law-finding power of
the jury, the eighteenth-century writers reflected an implicit
acceptance of a Lockeian view of the origins of civil society.
They took for granted the quasi balance of powers created by
the settlement of x68g and the dominant role of Parliament in
the making of law. The jury, even in the view of most of those
who favored jury law finding, was supposed to guarantee that

English law, whether common law or statutory law, was fairly
stated and fairly applied.
For some eighteenth-century jury proponents the jury was
not so much a part of the constitution as a symbol of the source
of power that created civil government and the constitution itself. Henry Burtenshaw maintained that the jury are not
the creatures, even of the constitution, but coeval with it-with
the constitution which declares all power to be in the people,
and which has survived and remained unviolated through
many revolutions of state government: they are themselves a
government in miniature, and a symbol of that general democracy in which resides, and through which, under various modifications, is dispersed, all the functions of power, of justice and
of policy. 56

But even Burtenshaw recognized that laws were made in Parliament or "abroad, by [the people's] habits of life and usages," so that the jury, in his view, was to "interpret those laws
when made. " 57 Most commentators took an even more
frankly instrumental view of the jury: the jury was a part of the
constitution, established in order to fill a gap or to balance lay
against official influence. Blackstone lent important support to
this watchdog theory of the criminal trial jury. He cautioned
against creation of more "convenient" procedures; the "delays, and little inconveniences in the forms of justice, are the
price that all free nations must pay for their liberty in more
substantial matters . . . . " 58 Despite ambiguity in its characterization of the jury's role, Blackstone's theory strongly implied that the jury remained a safeguard against some future
recurrence of executive or judicial tyranny.
Blackstone's contemporary Henry Dagge traced the origins
of civil society in terms familiar to eighteenth-century political
theorists. He began with a discussion of man in his natural
state and with a depiction of the resolution of dispute by private revenge; this period of continual strife, he asserted, gave

way to government and, eventually, to the creation of distinctive elements of government: legislative, executive, and judicial. Even at this stage," after the three powers were divided,"
difficulties remained:
The judicial power being entrusted with the exposition of the
law, and as it depended on their judgment whether the case or
fact sub lite, was or was not within the description of the law,
here was evidently a great latitude still left for the exercise of
partiality or oppression. 59
The "remedy," he concluded, was "the invention ofjuries. " 60
Dagge assured his readers that it seldom happened that juries
rejected the judge's instructions: "The opinion of the bench
has generally its due weight. " 61 For the most part, the jury was
to find fact and no more, and the better the primary institutions of government worked, the less the jury would be needed
as a safeguard of the liberties those institutions were designed
to protect. This view of the jury was adumbrated even by William Paley, who exhibited tolerance for a complex, sometimes
unpredictable, legal process. In his view, there would and
ought to be countervailing pressures, from which an equitable
solution would emerge. The jury's role could not be given
clearly defmed limits; thus Paley cautioned against "urging
too far the distinction between questions of law and matters of
fact. " 62
None of these prominent academic legal writers directed his
attention specifically to the debate resulting from trials for seditious libel. Indeed, none set out to write mainly about the
jury. Rather, each developed a distinctive approach to the legal
system generally, fitting the jury into the larger scheme of
things. None subscribed to a far-reaching theory of endemic
jury law deciding, but all believed-or strongly implied-that,
for the legal system to operate fairly, recourse to jury monitoring of judicial instructions on the law would sometimes be
necessary. This conception of the jury was of course shared-

and fruitfully used-by most writers who wrote in response to
the government's doctrine of seditious libel. For these latter
writers, however, the jury was not incidentally, but rather in
the main, a safeguard against oppression.
Robert Morris, the Wilkite barrister, sounded a theme to
which many of Mansfield's opponents rallied when he wrote:
"The great province of a jury in criminal matters is to make
true deliverance of the subject from false accusation, and especially from oppressive prosecutions of the Crown.' ' 63 The jury,
Glynn was quoted as stating at the trial in 1770 of the publisher
John Miller, is "in times of danger the asylum of the people. . . . " 64 It was to protect "every subject of the state, from
the abuse of executive power,'' wrote Thomas Leach, that the
English constitution required "the unanimous suffrage of
twelve of his equals. " 65 Judges, who were still dependent upon
the Crown for "pensions" and "places, which they hold at the
mere pleasure of their minister," 66 were not above "crafty distinctions and ensnaring eloquence"; they "throw dust in the
eyes, and confound the sense of a well-meaning jury. . . . "67
Such invective became commonplace in the years between the
Wilkes affair and the Dean of St. Asaph's trial.
The encomiums of the more radical supporters of the jury
typically began with generalities from Hale or Blackstone and
went on to the limits of their authors' imaginations. Jury trial
was, for example, central to "the grand or principal law of this
land, on which the justice of all the rest depend .... " 68 It was
through the jury that subjects judged "when the fundamental
laws are violated; when an attempt is made to subvert the constitution. " 69 Even the charges that jurors lacked legal training,
were just plain ignorant, or were subject to popular passions
were occasions for praise, albeit at times with a defensive tone.
Jurors, it was frequently said, did not lack the natural capacity
for the role they were being asked to play. They have, wrote
Manasseh Dawes, "generally a just sense of right or wrong. "70
''Juries have not a knowledge of the technical niceties of the

53

law, as a profession," Capel Lofft conceded, "but the Constitution presumes them to understand it as a rule of civil rights
in a general sense. " 71 "Thanks be to God!" Anthony
Highmore exclaimed, "there lives in mankind a sense of right
and wrong that compels them to form the most impartial judgment they can . . . . " 72 All three of these writers were trained
in law; all opposed one or another Crown policy; and all resented use of the libel laws to silence criticism.
A general sense of civil rights and a sense of right and wrong
were required, but not deep grounding in Scripture, custom,
or the common law. For some, this was the irreducible core
which law-finding theory had reached by the late eighteenth
century. So long as law deciding was linked to ''pious perjury''
or to egregious cases where the jury was required to stand as a
bulwark against judicial overreach, even the moderate, benchoriented Blackstone could be put to some use. George Rous,
yet another Wilkite barrister, quoted Blackstone's admonition
to subjects that they learn the law; their lack of such learning,
Blackstone had written, "has thrown more power into the
hands of judges to direct, control, and even reverse, their verdicts, than perhaps the constitution intended. " 73
Some who supported the law-finding jury conceded that
juries might make too much of their powers or misunderstand
how they ought to be employed. Rous, for example, wrote:
"Jurors, like judges, may err through ignorance, or be misled
by passion. " 74 But, he concluded, the constitution wisely contained a remedy-where, that is, a jury wrongly convicted the
defendant. Drawing, as did many other tract writers, upon
practice in common-run felonies, Rous asserted that "grace is
always extended to the prisoner upon a proper representation
from the judge. A refusal would be contrary to the duty of a
sovereign, who swears, at his coronation, to execute justice in
mercy. " 75 In the case of seditious libel, however-at least before 1792-the government feared what it viewed as unwarranted acquittals, not unwarranted convictions. Those radical
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pro-jury writers willing to face this problem manipulated the
language of the moderates Dagge and Blackstone, characterizing truly unwarranted acquittals as a "lesser inconvenience" 76
and retreating to the well-worn maxim that it was better that
many guilty men went free than that one innocent man was
convicted. However tolerable this maxim may have been in
cases of manslaughter or petty theft, it was unlikely that
authorities would be content to apply it to cases involving government critics.
4

Only a minority of pro-jury writers who addressed the problem of seditious libel dealt openly and at length with the further reaching of the two theories ofjury right, true law finding:
the jury's alleged right to reject an indictment, regardless of
the judge's instructions, on the grounds that it failed to charge
the defendant with a crime. Those who advanced this position
drew directly upon the late seventeenth-century tracts by
Hawles, Care, and the anonymous author of A Guide to juries,
all of whom had, in turn, drawn upon claims made by
Lilburne and Penn. Perhaps the strongest version of this argument was the statement of the printer and bookseller Joseph
Towers:
It cannot be supposed ... that any jury should be arbitrarily
directed to bring any man in guilty, when they are not convinced in their own minds, whether the action the accused person is charged with be a crime or not . . . not only whether he
has been guilty of the action alleged against him, but whether he
has been guilty of a crime.7 7

The most offensive aspect of the seditious libel doctrine-so
far as pro-jury writers were concerned-was that truth was not
a defense; moreover, the prosecution did not have to prove
that the alleged libel in fact brought the government into disre-
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pute or created an imminent threat to public order, even
though indictments for seditious libel alleged that the defendant had published certain statements "seditiously" and "factiously.'' Thus one writer, who reproduced some ten pages of
Hawles's famous tract, concluded in his own terms:
From all which it is evident, that however heinous a fact may
be represented by hard work and artful innuendoes in an indictment or information, the jury may with impunity, and ought in
conscience to bring in the general verdict, not guilty, not only
when they think the fact has not been proved by sufficient witnesses, but also when they think the fact is not such a heinous
fact as is charged in the indictment or information. 78

Another writer made the point in his comments upon the
Penn-Mead trial of a century earlier:
As the jury were not convinced, that the fact, with which Penn
and Mead were charged was in itself a crime, they were unwilling to condemn them; though, attending to the matter of fact
only, they could not avoid it, because the fact was fully
proved . . . . [I]t is plain, the jury had respect, in their last verdict, entirely to the matter of law. For as they were convinced,
that Penn and Mead had not been guilty of any criminal or illegal action, they could not honestly and conscientiously do anything but acquit them. 79

In their arguments for true law-fmding powers, jury proponents looked for support to the rules of criminal procedure and
to the nature of the substantive criminal law. Most of the arguments devolving from procedure touched upon the supposed
theoretical liability of the jury to an attaint. Although this ancient procedure had probably never been applied in criminal
cases, 80 most eighteenth-century jury proponents referred
only to its "disuse," drawing the conclusion (perhaps from
Restoratioh tracts) that attaint, like the fining of jurors, had

once been, but was no longer, permitted by English law. The
original law of attaint, they asserted, must have assumed the
right of juries to decide law as well as fact, for attaint had applied only in those cases where the jury had found "bad"
law. 81 A Treatise on the Right ofJuries (1771) carried this analysis
one step further: the fact that since Bushell's Case the law had
supplied no certain means of controlling jury verdicts (at least
in the case of an acquittal) proved not only that the jury had
the power but also that it had the right to find law. 82 Even Justice Willes, who voted with the majority in St. Asaph 's Case,
found this argument persuasive. 83 On the eve of Parliament's
consideration of the Libel Act, his views were rephrased by
Thomas Leach, a barrister and police magistrate, who wrote:
In the institutions of civil government, power and right, are,
and must be, convertible terms. Civil power, and civil right, are
the mere creatures of the law and know no other limits, than the
law imposes upon them. The law speaks the language of prohibition, not of admonition. What it permits to be done, uncensured, and confirms, when it is done, it has delegated the power
to do, and the exercise of that power, is of right. 84

Similarly, pro-jury writers argued that the theory of the special verdict presumed that juries had a valid law-finding role.
A jury could render a special verdict in a case if it doubted the
validity of a certain application of the law to the facts. 85 If the
jury had no such doubts, it was therefore said, the jury might
find law as well as fact. 86 This argument, however, established
nothing more than that juries applied law to fact. The law
might still be said to have been taken from the bench, a point
that many tract writers well understood. Finally, many writers
cited the practice of defense counsel in seditious libel cases to
support the proposition that juries had the right to consider
questions of law. The bench frequently allowed counsel to argue points of law to the jury or even to question the validity of
the official doctrine of seditious libel in their summations. 87
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Yet arguments that relied upon the nature of criminal procedure and trial practice were entirely too fragile to support a
far-reaching claim to jury law finding. The attaint issue
was dead (indeed, it had never been a live consideration in
criminal cases); the existence of special verdicts, it could be
countered, proved only that in some cases the jury had doubts
concerning a very restricted "law-applying" role. As for the
leeway allowed counsel in their summations, such judicial leniency was hardly a sound foundation for the construction of a
matter of jury right. Few laymen understood criminal procedure sufficiently to appreciate what were, in any case, tepid rejoinders to Mansfield's dissertations on the ever-growing body
of precedent.
Of greater importance-though, in logic, equally limitedwere arguments based upon the nature of the substantive
criminal law, not only in political cases but in common-run
cases as well. The criminal law, it was stated, was "within
reach of the plainest understanding. " 88 Such claims, it is true,
were only a pale reminder of mid-seventeenth-century assertions concerning the relationship between criminal law and the
Scriptures; nor was it the point that the common man could
know the law merely by examining his heart. But the criminal
law was knowable. The entire system of criminal justice assumed as much:
To say the truth, one could hardly imagine a more extravagant
absurdity, than to hold, that a criminal shall not remove the imputation of guilt by pleading ignorance of the law; and yet, that
a jury who try him have no capacities to judge of that law. 89

The logical conclusion of the argument that only the bench
and bar possessed the ability to understand the law, it was
said, was that "we may daily transgress without being wilfully
guilty. " 90 The robber, the sneak thief, the slayer-they knew
the law as it applied to them. The point was frequently repeated, always with a certain tone of astonishment: If the jury

was not to decide law because men oftheir station lacked the
necessary understanding, then the rationale for the official
doctrine of seditious libel was inconsistent with the requirement of mens rea. 91 The analogy to common-run cases-to the
common suspect, the "daily transgressor"-lent force to the
point, but, at the same time, the line of argument here involved did not ground a true law-finding theory. To say that
the jury possessed the ability to apply the law was not to say
that the law they were to apply was "found" by them rather
than set forth by the bench.

5

For many commentators the issues of freedom of the press
and, more generally, of the subject's right to criticize the government were more important than the jury question. The
jury was significant, not as an end in itself, but as a safeguard
against what were seen as the government's interested and
abusive prosecutions. Arguments asserting that the jury was
the protector of liberty were made both by those \\-ho conceived of the jury primarily as a fact finder and by those who
adhered to one or another variant of law-finding theory. Distrust of the government did not commit one to any particular
conception of the jury. Yet the doctrine of seditious libel posed
a special sort of problem. By drastically reducing the scope fox
factual determinations, the doctrine placed the defendant'.'
fate almost wholly in official hands. To assert the jury's right to
play its traditional fact-finding role required an attack on the
libel doctrine itself. Hence, all appeals to the jury necessarily
contained an express or implied demand that the jury reject
the bench's instructions regarding the allocation of duties between judge and jury. Only a few writers focused on the problem-it seemed to go without saying. Of the pro-jury writers,
Joseph Towers most effectively united the themes of distrust of
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government and the jury's right to decide the allocation-of-duties question raised by the seditious libel doctrine:
It would, perhaps, be as unreasonable, that kings should be
suffered themselves to determine the bounds of their own prerogative, as that judges should be permitted finally to decide,
when the point in contest is, what is the extent of their own
jurisdiction, and what is the extent of that of juries. 92

Thus, much, if not most, of the literature proclaiming the
jury's right to find law as well as fact was concerned with the
problem of the allocation of duties between judge and jury.
Though many tract writers seem not to have realized it, this
conceptualization of the problem hid important disagreements
on the law itself. Many writers assigned as facts for the jury
matters that the bench did not consider at all relevant. Nonetheless, for many opponents of the official doctrine the claim
regarding jury law finding was simply an exhortation to jurors
that they insist that certain questions were matters of fact
rather than matters of law. Once the jury had claimed the
question for its own, it would merely find the fact, in seditious
libel as in other cases.
In the years following Rex v. Franklin, 93 the assertion that seditiousness was purely a question of fact became quite common. Pro-jury writers argued that, at one level, the question of
the seditiousness of the writing could be reduced to the question: Had the writing "scandalized" the government? But
what test should the jury apply when making this assessment?
The proponents of free speech and press and of the trial jury
insisted that mere evidence of negative criticism was not sufficient, that a writing was not criminal unless, at the very least,
measurable harm was its probable result. 94 Some characterized the test as more complex still. Robert Morris thought it
should be "[t]he purport of expressions, the tendency to sedition, the infamy, the reproach of language"; that, he said,
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''can never so well be decided as by the common class of mortals to whom the publication is made. Who [is] more interested
than juries (for juries are composed of the people) to preserve
the peace and order ofthe state? . . . Juries are a tribunal ever
changing as the times; they judge of men's writings and actions by what they see and feel. " 95 The decider offact, George
Rous asserted, sounding a theme dear to the hearts of the
Wilkites, "must enter into common life ... must attend to the
politics of the day. . . must imbibe the sentiments of the people . . . . Juries taken by lot ... are peculiarly the proper
judges in cases of libel. " 96 The determination that must
be made, wrote Joseph Towers, required practically no
knowledge of the law; the allegedly seditious publications were
"generally addressed to men of all professions, and such of
them as can be understood only by lawyers, are not very likely
to produce tumults or insurrections. " 97 Highmore developed
the same theme: If one argues that a libel is dangerous because
it might arouse the common people, then one assumes that the
people understand the writing and therefore must be qualified
to be jurors, to determine whether a writing is, in fact, likely to
arouse. "No man ever wrote, or read, sedition, but he knew
that it was so: and this, without a little more knowledge of the
law than is amply sufficient to answer all the purposes of his
civil capacity as a citizen. " 98 Here, where pro-jury writers referred specifically to the kind of fact finding they believed relevant to the matter of seditious libel, they frequently drew attention to the jury's daily assessment of the element of provocation in cases ofhomicide. 99 It is possible that some pro-jury
tract writers, in their attempts to portray seditiousness as a
question of fact as in other cases, were induced to concede
more than they otherwise might have. They were led to define
seditiousness in terms of a writing's tendency to arouse, its impact on others, especially on the class of common people from
which jurors were typically drawn. Some writers seem at times
to have turned their attention from the question of the truth,

or of the intrinsic value, of the criticism, matters that were less
easily portrayed as matters of fact within the competence of the
average jury. 100
At yet a second level, most writers insisted that proof of
scandal did not suffice to establish true seditiousness. There
had also to be a finding of intent to scandalize-true criminal intent-indeed, true malice. 101 This, too, was at times
portrayed as a matter of pure fact finding in terms with which
we are now familiar. What words were intended to mean, said
Morris, was a factual, hence a jury, question; 102 though establishing that meaning, as Francis Maseres argued, required the
jury to draw inferences from facts, those inferences were "secondary" facts, which required "common sense, not technical
learning." 103 Juries were especially qualified in cases of libel
since they knew "street talk" 104 and could draw the proper inferences. As another writer put it: a "jury of common coffeehouse politicians in London" was best qualified to determine
the fact of whether words were meant to be scandalous. 105
In most tracts, however, the discussion of criminal intent
moved well beyond the immediate issue of seditious libel.
Here, more than at any other point, writers looked to the role
of juries in common-run felonies. Traditionally, juries assessed
guilt or innocence largely on the basis of the intent with which
an act had been committed. It was within this assessment that
the jury, consciously or otherwise, had always applied its own
standards of justice, weighed intent and conduct (and perhaps
reputation) against the prescribed sanction. 106 By ruling that
criminal intent would be inferred by the bench from the writing itself, the bench threatened the more modest but ancient
law-finding tradition and, hence, the values that the right to
jury trial had long epitomized.
The pro-jury writers' inability consistently to maintain the
idea-ought one say, the tactical stance?-that the question of
intent could be reduced to a purely factual matter is reflected
in their constant analogizing to the jury's role in homicide

cases. In homicide cases, as many tract writers pointed out,
the bench drew the jury's attention to the differences among
malice aforethought, sudden deliberateness, unintentional
homicide, and intentional but justifiable homicide, and thereupon left the matter to the jury. 107 The homicide analogy was
in fact cited to prove that juries had the right to apply law to
the facts. It was this traditional law-applying role that the
bench was attempting to remove in seditious libel cases, or so
many pro-jury writers charged. 108 Thomas Leach, extrapolating from homicide to "all other cases of crime" -by which he
meant seditious libel-declared:
On indictment for murder, the jury decide, not only that the
person, charged to have been murdered, did die, in consequence of the act of the defendant, and that such act resulted
from a design to kill; which are matters of fact: But they also decide, whether from the particular circumstances, attending the
homicide, it is to be ranked in that class, which the law justifies
or excuses; or whether from the degree of criminal intention in
the defendant it comes within the legal defmition of the crime of
manslaughter; or amounts to murder, which, if the intention of
the libeller be matter oflaw, are evidently also matters oflaw. 109

For Leach, as for so many others across the half-century of
active debate, the homicide analogy provided the basic model.
Did the defendant strike (did he publish); did the blow cause
death (did the writing scandalize); were the blow and death (or
the scandal) intended and, if so, was there true malice or was
the act justified or excusable? There was bound to be occasional disagreement between judge and jury on what constituted one or another degree of malice, on the limits ofjustification and excuse, or on their application to a given case. That
was often true in homicide and it was certain to be true in seditious libel. The centuries-long tradition of allowing the jury
leeway in its application of the law of homicide appears to have
colored assumptions about the appropriate judge-jury role in

seditious libel. 110 And just as disagreements between judge
and jury on the law of homicide were conceptualized as disagreements merely about application of law to fact, so were
such disagreements conceptualized by many opponents of the
official doctrine of seditious libel.
6

The claim that the jury's inalienable role was that which they
played daily in routine felonies-the application of the law that
had been set forth by the bench-lay at the core of the attack
on the law of seditious libel. The true law-finding issues of the
debate-the jury's capacity to comprehend the law sufficiently
to determine whether the judge had chosen apt precedents or
had interpreted the relevant common law or statutes correctly-would continue to attract great attention, but the more
routine discussion of whether the jury had the right merely to
apply the law in seditious libel "as in other cases" was perhaps
a more important aspect of the debate. When the pro-jury
writers addressed this most basic level of "law finding," they
revealed something of their conception of the nature and purpose of the jury trial in all criminal cases.
It is important to remember that, in practice, the criminal
trial had always been person- (as well as act-) oriented. Assessment of the defendant's character had traditionally affected
the jury's view of his just deserts. 111 Character and credibility
of course bore on the question of whether the defendant had
committed the act alleged in the indictment, and in that sense
the jury found the facts that it was charged to find. This observation was contained in The Doctrine of Libels and the Duty of
Juries fairly stated, published in 1752:
[I]f from the character of the person libelled they think they
have reason to believe, that he has been guilty of those facts, and
that from the character of the person accused of libelling they

have reason to believe [the defendant] would not have charged
any man with such facts unless he had known him to be guilty,
they ought to bring their verdict Not Guilty.... This is a latitude which every jury ought to take, and a latitude which will be
of great importance for every man to endeavor to preserve a
good character in his neighborhood. 112
This "latitude" was implicit in every jury trial. Thus George
Stanhope in his sermon entitled The Duty ofjuries, which was
delivered in 1701 at the Lent Assizes, conceded that in close
cases,
we may allow some abatements for a criminal action alleged
against a person unblameable for the main, and impute it to ignorance, or sudden transport or passion, or misadventure,
rather than to malice and wicked design; which abatements
cannot fairly be allowed to those abandoned wretches, who are
scandalous for mischievous dispositions and a profligate conversation.113
The problem was how to delineate between appropriate and
inappropriate "abatements." That depended upon the sufficiency of the proof offered at trial, of which juries were without
dispute the final judges. The official doctrine of seditious libel
avoided this assessment entirely. The only facts left to the jury
were so fully proved as to be virtually undeniable, and there
was in any case nothing to balance against them, since intent
was "implied" as a matter oflaw. What the opponents of the
official law were demanding was the return to the jury, as a
question of fact or of application of law to fact, of the complicated, intensely social question of criminal intent.
The seditious libel literature often assigned to the jury an
even more open-ended role than the above discussion of
criminal intent suggests. Fundamentally, according to projury writers, whether in prosecutions for seditious libel; homicide, theft, or any other criminal offense, the defense of the

(truly) general verdict amounted to the defense of the defendant's right to a "merciful" judgment by peers. And "mercy"
might be appropriate even in cases where the defendant was
guilty under the law. The core of the power to decide "law as
well as fact" was the jury's right to nullify the law in particular
cases without rejecting it as a general matter.
That the English criminal law was a "merciful" law was a
cliche in the eighteenth-century literature. 114 The identification of the jury with mercy operated on two levels. Most
writers, referring to the fact-finding process, asserted that, as
Towers put it:' 'Where the matter is doubtful, in criminal prosecutions, an acquittal is always most consonant to the spirit of
the law of England." 115 Hinting at a yet broader role for the
granting of mercy, Highmore observed: "[T]he jury know
that by their verdict alone, and not by the knowledge of law in
the judge, the prisoner at the Bar must be acquitted or suffer
death." 116 As in the capital felonies of murder or theft, he implied, so in the noncapital high misdemeanor of seditious libel.
Morris drew an analogy to the royal power of pardon: "Like
the king in the extension of mercy [the jury] make so noble a
use of their power when their consciences permit them to acquit." 117
In his Address to the People of Scotland, William Smellie described this second, commonplace, and ultimately more significant aspect of the jury's application of mercy. Commenting
upon the statutory extension ofjury trial to Scotland, and borrowing the terminology of the English seditious libel debate,
he asserted:
If, therefore, the power of judging of the law as well as the fact,
were annihilated, the very intention of the legislature would be
defeated; because the courts, and not the jury, would then be
the sole judges. Intention is the essence of crimes. The facts
[charged] may be distinctly proved. But, if from particular circumstances, the jury are convinced in their own minds, that the
[defendant] either had no intention to commit a crime, or that
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the crime is not of so heinous a nature as to merit the punishment concluded for in the indictment, in all cases of this kind,
the jury have not only a right, but they are bound, by the spirit
of their oaths, and by the laws of God and man, to find the [defendant] Not Guilty of the crime . . . . They consider the nature
of the crime, and the punishment that ought or ought not to be
inflicted. In all such cases, the jury must necessarily determine
both the law and the fact. 118

Finding "law as well as fact," applying law to fact, or rendering a merciful verdict amounted to assessing the nature of both
the defendant's intent and his act in the light of the punishment that would follow upon his conviction. The jury might
approve of the defendant's behavior, as in some political cases,
or might disapprove of it but deem the prescribed punishment
too severe, as in some common-run felonies. Very different
underlying motives, to be sure, but nonetheless, at least within
the confines of some jury tracts, the fusion ofjury theories was
complete.

7

Fox's Libel Act marked a triumph for those whose concept of
the English constitution was grounded in history. It vindicated
the historic role of the jury as the last line of defense against executive tyranny. Although precedent could be found for treating seditious libel as an anomaly, the prior official doctrine
nonetheless seemed to many a dangerous departure from
deeply held assumptions about English governance.
At one level Parliament's concern was with the law. Fox's
Act was couched as a declaration of the common law, resting
less on specific precedent than on general principles of that
law. 119 Parliament looked first to the law regarding criminal
trials generally. That law was assumed to govern; exceptions
would be tolerated only where that law itself provided compel-

ling reasons for them. Parliament's solution to the seditious libel problem was also the result both of politics and of the
nearly irresistible force of broad constitutional principles. The
pressures from the expansion of rights of speech and press
were enormous. 120 Those rights might still be limited (few
questioned the appropriateness of punishment for truly seditious writings), but they could not be reined in through what
appeared to society at large to be a drastic revision of the historically vindicated balance of power between judge and jury.
Retreat to the technical high ground of ''questions of law''
served only further to expose the government to attack by the
opposition. In manipulating the balance of authority at trial,
the government-or so it was seen-was manipulating the institution through which it had historically ruled and on which
it rested its claim to legitimacy. Having administered the law
largely with the aid of the jury (one is tempted to conclude),
the Crown and courts found they could not now govern
mainly through the bench. 121
To appreciate the way in which the government was captured by its own administrative history, we must recognize
how little England's rulers controlled the circumstances that
made law fmding, or discretionary fact finding, a dominant
element in the administration of the criminal law. For the most
part, prosecution for felony, though privately initiated and
joined by the government, proceeded in accordance with the
attitudes of society at large. The alliance between authority
and mercy-granting juries reflected a mixture of wise policy,
shared assumptions about justice, and acquiescence in the inevitable.122 We must be cautious about extending the argument that authorities manipulated the selective enforcement of
the criminal law in order to secure the deference of those they
ruled to the problem of the use of the criminal trial jury. 123 If
we focus too narrowly on the administration of the criminal
law in the eighteenth century, we obscure the question of the
roots of the system of mitigation. These practices were histori-
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cally the by-product of the criminal law in cases-theft and
homicide-where frequently complainant, defendant, and
jury were, relatively speaking, members of the same class. 124
In such cases, the Crown and the bench and their attendant officials had an interest in overseeing the maintenance of order,
but often they played the role of referees who lacked the resources, time, or stake in the outcome to prevent the jury from
reaching a verdict according to its own sense of justice. Moreover, these practices, which long predated the eighteenth century, reflected social attitudes that were not easily managed or
always willingly tolerated. This is not to say that authorities
failed to capitalize on these sources of potential weakness, consciously or otherwise. It is to say that, to the extent authorities
reaped the benefits of governing through merciful justice, the
interaction of rulers and ruled was complex and two-sided. In
important ways, authorities prevailed at the behest of those
they sought to rule.
Our study of the seditious libel debate suggests that in yet
another, related respect we must modify our understanding of
the political and social implications of eighteenth-century law
enforcement. The two strands of theory regarding the jury's
rightful role could not forever remain separate. Jury law fmding in political cases could not be kept distinct from jury resolution in common-run felonies. In the popular mind at least,
the strength and reach of the arguments against the seditious
libel doctrine were almost certainly influenced by the nature of
jury practice in common-run cases. Might it be that the same
authorities who allowed juries to share the powers of mitigation in common-run cases found themselves by virtue of that
policy on the defensive in prosecutions for seditious libel? If so,
we must recognize that authorities sometimes reaped, not deference, but a bitter harvest largely of their own making. The
irony is less striking than might at first appear: the policy of
sharing powers of mitigation was, as we have seen, little more
than acquiescence in practices authorities could not easily
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have eliminated. Having (over the centuries) converted great
weaknesses into moderate strength, England's rulers found
that that strength had, after all, its naturallimits. 125
It has been wisely observed that English authorities came to
accept as binding certain concepts of due process in which they
had cloaked their exercise of pure power. 126 Something akin to
this phenomenon seems to have been at work in Parliament's
resolution of the seditious libel crisis. The Libel Act debates reflected a consensus on one principle only, that the criminal trial
jury should have a right to return a general verdict on all facts
at issue. That principle was recognized as having long constitutional standing. To deny it (or seem to deny it) in trials for seditious libel was not only to offend that principle but to risk political fire for offending it precisely in those circumstances that
suggested the worst sort of motives.l27
Many in Parliament, certainly as of 1770, were, as a matter
of legal theory, persuaded by Mansfield's defense of the official
doctrine of seditious libel. 128 Precedent and the uniqueness of
seditious libel seemed to ground an exception to the general
rule. What, then, doomed the exception? Constitutionalism
and politics are rarely separable. Parliament responded to
both without being able to isolate either. The principle of a
right to a general verdict in all cases had come to be identified
socially with the prevailing theories regarding the purposes of
the criminal trial jury. The principle was accepted by some because they believed its rejection would appear wrongly to be a
rejection of more general principles that all in fact accepted. It
was accepted by others who would themselves have viewed a
rejection in that way. At base-in seditious libel-was the historic role of the jury as a safeguard against tyranny. So long as
that issue could be kept from being entangled with others, the
sides might be clearly drawn. Much would depend upon
whether one viewed the settlement of x68g as having rendered
the safeguard unnecessary. But it could not be kept separate.
So long as there were many who distrusted the role of authori-

ties in seditious libel cases, the settlement would never be solely a matter of institutional framework as such. It would of
course be a matter of the movement for free speech and of the
liberties of subjects generally. No doubt that is how many
members of Parliament saw the issue. But it would also be a
matter of how society regarded the practice of institutions, of
the very real importance of de facto powers, such as those of the
jury in common-run felony cases. The idea that discretionary
lay fact finding was central to the administration of justice had
taken on a life of its own, and no part of that administration
could be shielded from it. Authorities could not, as it were,
"bifurcate" the practice of trial by jury. The same judges who
tolerated, or even encouraged, mitigated verdicts in homicide
or theft could not easily explain why juries ought to play so
limited a role in seditious libel. Notions of consistency and coherence were integral to the late eighteenth-century conception of justice. Nothing could gainsay them, not even the attendant risk of more subtle forms of inconsistency and incoherence-that is, inconsistent jury verdicts-as the price of
seditious libel law reform. 129
The recognition of the right of the criminal trial jury to return a general verdict resolved one immediate political problem, but it contributed little to the resolution of some other
long-standing problems of the criminal law. One of the important side effects of the seditious libel controversy was its intensification of the prevailing social conceptions of the criminal
trial jury. The magnification of those conceptions and their
translation to the sphere of political misdemeanors may have
affected the administration of the law generally and delayed
the movement for reform of the law of sanctions. l3o
It is possible, of course, that the seditious libel problem and
its resolution only temporarily delayed, and then ultimately
accelerated, the movement for reform of the law of sanctions.
The penal reformers' argument against jury law fmding-that
is, against merciful fact finding in common-run cases-lost
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some of its appeal when the integrity of the jury system seemed
to be threatened in political misdemeanors. Resistance to the
bench involved a glorification of jury independence; criticism
of juries on all fronts may have become unfashionable. But in
the years following passage of the Libel Act, juries, as is well
known, convicted more often than they had before in cases of
seditious libel. 131 The general verdict allowed the tenor of the
times to affect decisions and reminded observers of the volatility of jury attitudes. In those years, the warnings of Mansfield, John Bowles, and others seemed to have been well
taken: 132 the defendant's security was at risk; no one could be
certain how juries would "apply" the law. One obvious solution to the problem of the jury that convicted against the law
was a fuller right of appeal. But for the time being, the uncertainty of the law produced by the general verdict in seditious
libel cases may have made it easier for penal reformers to return to criticism of jury discretion in common-run cases. The
solution there was not to do away with the general verdictthat matter had been placed beyond reach-but rather to
achieve certainty of law and punishment through the unmitigated imposition of humane and moderate sanctions.
Thus, if the seditious libel crisis did delay, it did not destroy,
the movement for reform of the law of sanctions. The constitutionalization of the general verdict raised the stakes for the
penal reformers. Having reidentified the jury as the quintessential democratic institution in English society, Parliament
would have to demonstrate defmitively what eighteenth-century reform proponents had only suggested: that the prevailing practice of jury-based mitigation in routine felonies had
grown to such proportions that it was making a mockery of the
law. Nothing less would suffice before Parliament could reduce the jury's role as a mediator in common-run cases.
Changes in jury trial would follow, rather than precede,
changes in English attitudes toward the entire problem of the
administration of the criminal law . 133
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have required any or all of these tests, although they sometimes addressed one of them as though it were the "true" test. For an excellent discussion of "Father of Candor's" near rejection of the "badtendency" test, see Levy, Legacy of Suppression, 149-54. "Father of
Candor" implied that true han:p or injury ought to be required (An
Enquiry into the Doctrine, Lately Propagated, concerning Libels, J#zrrants,
and the Seizure ofPapers . . . in a Letter to Mr. Almon.from the Father of Candor [London, 1764], 20, p). This position went beyond that taken by
other writers, but it seems that (to the extent "Father of Candor" ac-

ss

tually espoused it) it did not include statements that were "wilfully
false" (48, I6o).
IOI. For example, Another Letter to Mr. Almon, in matter of Libel (London, I770 ), 3I: The author states that the jury ought to acquit if the
defendant acted "without any wicked intent." He analogizes this to
a finding that a defendant in homicide slew "without malice" and
then continues: "[I]f the jury are convinced, that although [the defendant] wrote or printed and published [the work], he did so without traiterous, seditious, scandalous, or malicious intent, they ought
to find him ... not guilty. . . . "
I02. Morris, Letter to ... Aston, 42.
103. Francis Maseres, An Enquiry into the Extent of the Power ofJuries,
on trials of indictments or informations (London, I78s; originally published, I776), 30-31.
Io4. Ibid.
ms. Another Letter to Mr. Almon, 48.
106. See sec. 2 above. See Green, "Societal Concepts" (above, n.
30), passim.
I07. For example, The Doctrine of Libels, and the Duty ofJunes fairly
stated (London, I7S2), 14-Is; Another Letter to Mr. Almon, 3I; Towers, Observations on the rights and duty ofJuries, 21.
108. For example, Doctn"ne of Libels, I4-Is.
109. Leach, Considerations on the Matter of Libel, 7·
no. It is not surprising that pro-jury writers drew primarily upon
common practices in homicide cases rather than upon such practices
in prosecutions for theft, which accounted for most of the business of
the assize courts. In the case of theft, mitigation operated typically as
an open means of commuting the death sentence in favor of defendants who had clearly committed the act with which they had been
charged. It is true that it was also employed where the evidence was
doubtful, but that too was a function of the desire to use execution
only sparingly. The thief s behavior was viewed as premeditated and
insidious, virtually always as reprehensible, rarely as excusable. It is
true that in most cases, especially where there had not been physical
violence, the act itself was deemed by many as not meriting capital
punishment. Moreover, the thief s behavior was often seen as in part
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the product of social conditions; it was hoped that the thief might be
reformed. But the thiefs behavior was viewed nonetheless as intrinsically evil.
Homicide presented a more complex problem. Although the taking of a life had always been viewed as a particularly serious matter,
the defendant's intent could be very evil or fully justified or something in between. It might be (and often was) excusable under the
law. Thus, while in some homicide cases verdicts of self-defense, accident, or manslaughter served to mitigate the law of sanctions in
favor of defendants whose acts were nonetheless viewed socially as
evil, as they nearly always were in theft, in many other homicide
cases such verdicts reflected a very different social response: the behavior of the true self-defender was fully accepted. And like the true
self-defender (the notion ran), the true "public defender" (i.e., the
alleged libeler) deserved at least vindication, if not approbation.
The homicide analogy was also attractive because the nature of
the jury's resolution was often hidden from view, perhaps even from
the conscious understanding of the jurors themselves. It was a process around which myths might grow. Eighteenth-century commentators could suppose that jurors in homicide trials were engaged
mainly in a subtle assessment of the defendant's intent at the time he
committed the homicide in question. The juror's consideration of
the defendant's reputation and character might be assimilated to
their determination of the defendant's intent. This consideration
need not be understood as the largely separate matter that all contemporaries knew it was in theft cases, where more often than not
reputation and character influenced the jury mainly in its "sentencing" role.
Finally, opponents of the official doctrine of seditious libel were
greatly influenced by Rawles, who, as we have seen, cited the jury's
right to decide among the various kinds of homicide verdicts as evidence of their right to decide law as well as fact. Through Rawles,
and perhaps without realizing it, eighteenth-century writers reached
back to the parliamentary censure of Chief Justice Kelyng in 1667
(for his treatment of juries, mainly in homicide cases, see n. 39
above) and, ultimately, to the de facto practices of medieval juries.
The daily practice in cases involving theft conditioned attitudes regarding the role of mercy and the right of the jury to share assess-

ment of just deserts. But it was the jury's role in homicide cases that
allowed the strongest, most acceptable, and best-documented argument for the jury's right to "apply" the law within the "factual"
assessment of whether the defendant had acted with a truly criminal
intent.
m. See Beattie, "Crime and the Courts" (above, n. 44), 173-74,
179, for a discussion of the impact of reputation and character on verdicts in the eighteenth century. These considerations were influential
also at the reprieve and pardoning stages. It is likely that judicial and
royal attitudes influenced those of trial jurors, and vice versa. Indeed, this dialectical pattern of influence was probably present from
the beginning of trial by jury.
112. Doctrine of Libels, 10.
113. George Stanhope, The Duty of Juries (London, 1701), 12.
Stanhope added: "But still ... these are but probabilities and presumptions and must come in their proper place. For where they are
admitted to over-balance credible and fully peremptory proof, there
we offend against the Text (i.e., Levit., XIX, 15) and have respect of
persons in judgment" (ibid.).
114. For example, Uohn Rayner?], An Inquiry into the Doctrine,
Lately Propagated, concerning Attachments of Contempt (London, 1769), 4041; Treatise on the Right ofJun·es, 42; Paley, Pn.nciples ofMoral and Political
Philosophy, 522.
115. Towers, Observations on the rights and duty ofJuries, 109-10.
116. Highmore, Reflections on the distinction usually adopted, 26.
117. Morris, Letter to ... Aston, 40.
118. William Smellie, An Address to the People of Scotland on the Nature,
Powers and Privileges ofJuries (Edinburgh, 1815; originally published
1784), 13-15.
119. 32 Geo. 3, c. 6o (1792). For the debates on the form that the act
ought to take, see Hansard, Parliamentary History, 29:551-602 (Commons), 726-42 (Lords), 1036-47 (Lords), 1293-1300 (Lords), 1361-71
(Opinions of the Judges), 1404-31 (Lords), 1534-38 (Lords). The
act began: "Whereas doubts have arisen whether ... it be competent to the jury . . . ; be it therefore declared and enacted . . . "
Holdsworth (History of English Law, 10:690) accepts the view that the
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act was couched in declaratory form in order to suggest that the
courts had been mistaken in their view of the preexisting law.
120. Holdsworth, History of English Law, ro:672-74. Holdsworth
believes that the judges were in fact correct in their statement of the
law but that "it was clear that the law as laid down by the judges was
quite out of harmony with the practical ideas and public opinion of
the time" (674). Levy (Legacy of Suppression, 249-52) briefly discusses
the tract campaign that preceded the passage of Fox's Libel Act.
121. This conclusion is necessarily tentative; I shall develop it further in my forthcoming book. I have stated the point broadly, and
mean it to have ~ide reference, but it may be that it appli~s mainly to
the disparity between the treatment of routine cases on the one hand
and seditious libel on the other, and that contemporaries viewed that
disparity as an isolated phenomenon.
122. See sec. 2 above.
123. See n. 46 above.
124. Langbein, "Albion's Fatal Flaws" (above, n. 46), 107. But see
Douglas Hay, "War, Dearth, and Theft in the Eighteenth Century:
The Record of the English Courts," Past and Present, no. 95 (1982): 154
n. roo. There is need for more research on this matter. My essential
point is that, whatever the status difference between suspects and
their accusers, the status difference between accusers and the bench
was frequently far greater. Moreover, accusers and accused were
typically from the same locale; judges oversaw local disputes to
which they were themselves outsiders, both geographically and socially. This was probably as much or even more the case in earlier
centuries. So long as jurors typically took their lead from the bench,
the bench countenanced substantial leeway in less serious cases. And
even when jurors took their lead from the bench, they were responding to judicial attitudes that were themselves in part the reflection of
long-held and widely shared community standards.
125. I have made this argument in the present essay with respect to
the administration of criminal law in the eighteenth century. I believe that it applies as well to earlier periods. Judges in the medieval
period may have sensed that their relaxed treatment ofjuries in most
cases made it difficult for them to control juries in those few cases in
which they took a real interest. The early modem bench may have
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analyzed the resistance to fining jurors in similar terms. The phenomena I am describing were present from the outset of the jury trial
experience. The contest over the doctrine of seditious libel was of
special importance because it involved widespread political debate
and revealed the limits of authority during the very period in which
authority was (ostensibly) coming to have relatively substantial control over the administration of criminal law.
126. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters, 158-6g: "And the rulers were,
in serious senses, whether willingly or unwillingly, the prisoners of
their own rhetoric; they played the games of power according to
rules which suited them, but they could not break those rules or the
whole game would be thrown away" (263). See also Hay, "Property,
Authority, and the Criminal Law" (above, n. 46), 32fT.
127. For references to the Libel Act debates, seen. ng above.
128. See n. 23 above.
129. Mansfield, in Rex v. Shipley (St. Tr., 21:1040 ),stressed the problem of inconsistent verdicts: "To be free, is to live under a government by law . . . . Miserable is the condition of individuals, dangerous is the condition of the state, if there is no certain law, or, which is
the same thing, no certain administration of law to protect individuals, or to guard the state .... In opposition to this, what is contended for? That the law shall be in every particular cause what any
twelve men . . . shall be inclined to think, liable to no review, and
subject to no control. . . . Under such an administration oflaw, no
man could tell, no counsel could advise, whether a paper was or was
not punishable. '' See also John Bowles, Considerations on the Respective
Rights ofjudge andJury, particularly upon Trials for Libel, occasioned by an
expected motion of the Right Han. Charles-James Fox (London, 1791), 4: "It
would be next to impossible that [the jurors'] decision should accord
with any uniform and fixed principles. The consequence would be,
the prevalence of confusion and uncertainty in all legal proceedings
where intervention of a jury takes place. A total loss of freedom must
of course ensue; for the essence of freedom consists in the certainty of
law."
130. This is, of course, a matter of speculation. Doubtless, many
factors delayed the impact of the criticisms of the late eighteenth-century reformers. I plan to return to this problem in future research.

go

131. Holdsworth, History of English Law, 10:693; Levy, Legacy of
Suppression, 252-54. Both Holdsworth and Levy rely heavily on
Stephen's account of the aftermath of the act. See Sir James Fitzjarnes Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England, 3 vols. (London: Macmillan and Co., 1883), 2:362-63.
132. Seen. 129 above.
133· In chapter 9 of my forthcoming book I shall survey the early
nineteenth-century developments that resulted in changes in the role
of the criminal trial jury.

